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authority from .relying on a defense of *failure to file properly a
notice of claim.
ARTICLE: 6-

JOINDER OF CLAIMs, CONSOLIDATION AND SEVERANCE

CPLR 603: Court grants separate trial for severable issues.
Pursuant to CPLR 603, a trial court may on its own motion
sever the issues in an action, and order a separate trial of any
claim or of any separate issue for convenience or to avoid prejudice.
In Hacker v. City of New York," the appellate division, first
department, in interpreting CPLR 603, explained and expanded the
procedure of granting separate trials of severable issues. In Hacker,
an action for personal injuries, the parties stipulated that the issue
of liability be tried by the court without a jury, in advance of the
issue of damages. Having found for the plaintiff on the issue of
liability, the court ordered the trial of damages to be placed on the
calendar. The City then appealed and moved for a stay of the trial
of damages pending this appeal. The instant court, in a un'animous opinion, held that defendant was entitled to appeal from the
judgment on the separate issue of liability, and granted a stay of the
trial of damages.
This decision was contrary to Bliss v. Londner,9s wherein the
second department held that although separate trials on the issues'
of liability and damages were proper, a finding on the liability issue
was merely a ruling in the course of the trial, and an appeal from
such a ruling must await the entry of a judgment. The instant
court called the Bliss decision irrelevant because "we do not have
in this case .
'one continuous proceeding' in which the issues
of liability and damages proceed to determination together. ...
The court compared the appeal allowed here with an appeal from
an order granting stummary judgment and directing a=i assessment
of damages.
ARTICLE 10-

PARTIES GENERALLY

Vouching in: Available where party sought to, be vouched in isthe defendant's indemnitor.
Vouching in, the common-law ancestor of impleader, 9 is used
today in cases where impleader cannot be used.98 The defendant,
App. Div. 2d 35, 266 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1st Dep't 1966).
9520 App. Div. 2d 640, 246 N.Y.S.2d. 296 (2d Dep't 1964).
9425

96 Hiacker v. City of New York, 25 App., Div. 2d 35, 37, 266 N.Y.S.2d
194, 196 '(1st Dep't 1966).

97 CPLR 1007.
98 For example, impleader cannot be used where the third person is not
subject :to the jurisdiction of the court in which the defendant has been
sued.
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without making the third person a party, may vouch him in by
giving him sufficient notice of the pendency of the suit and by
offering him the opportunity to control the defense. 99 Whether or
not the third person chooses to accept, he would then be held bound
by the judgment. This procedure, however, may only be used when
the person sought to be vouched in is the indemnitor of the defendant.
In C. K. S. Inc. v. Helen Borgenicht Sportswear, Inc.,' °0 the
plaintiff retailer sought to recover the amount paid by him in
settlement of a separate action for personal injuries sustained when
a blouse sold by the plaintiff caught fire. The plaintiff, claiming
that the defendant was the manufacturer of the blouse and, therefore, through an implied warranty of fitness, an indemnitor, vouched
him in.
In reversing an order of the lower court, the appellate division,
first department, held that in the subsequent indemnification action
it was proper for the defendant to show that he was not the plaintiff's indemnitor and, therefore, that he could not be vouched in.10
The court noted, however, that had it been conclusively established
below that the defendant was an indemnitor, he could not here
deny liability by contesting facts already established. 0 2 Had it
been determined that the defendant was the plaintiff's indemnitor,
he would have been bound by that decision in the subsequent indemnification action.
CPLR 1025:

Limited partner cannot sue derivatively on behalf
of his partnership.
In Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch.,03 the second circuit permitted limited partners to sue on behalf of the partnership
after the general partners had rendered themselves unable to sue
by placing the partnership in the hands of a liquidator allegedly
affiliated with the defendants.
Though it has been suggested that New York law would be
influenced by Klebanow,0 4 in Millard v. Newmark & Co., 0 - the
appellate division, first department, in a 3-2 decision, held that 32
of 100 limited partners could not maintain a derivative suit on
behalf of the partnership. The majority in Millard distinguished
09
Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. First Nat' Bank & Trust Co., 281
N.Y. 162, 167-63, 22 N.E2d 324, 326 (1939).
100 25 App. Div. 2d 218, 268 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1st Dep't 1966).
101 C. K. S. Inc. v. Helen Borgenicht Sportswear, Inc., 25 App. Div. 2d
218,0 263 N.Y.S2d 409 (1st Dep't 1966).
2 2 Id. at 220, 268 N.Y.S.2d at 411.
103 344 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1965).
104 E.g., Standing of Limited Partners to Sue Derivatively, 65 CoLum. L.
Ray. 1463 (1965).
10524 App. Div. 2d 333, 266 N.Y.S2d 254 (1st Dep't 1966).

